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Abstract: History offers many examples of dictators who worsened their behavior 
significantly over time (like Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe), while there are also cases 
of dictators who have displayed remarkable improvements (like Jerry Rawlings of 
Ghana). We show that such mutations can result from rational behavior when the 
dictator’s  flow  use  of  repression  is  complementary  to  his  accumulated  stock  of 
wrongdoings.  This  complementarity  gives  rise  to  two  steady  states  (one  where 
repression is low and one where repression is high) and implies that any individual 
rising to power in this setup has the potential to end up as either a moderate leader, or 
as a dreaded tyrant. Our model shows that dictators are more likely to derail with 
higher levels of divertible funds available, for example stemming from fungible aid 
inflows or from the exploitation of natural resources. 
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Let them hate me, as long as they fear me.
Caligula, Roman Emperor from 37 to 41 AD.
At some point in the second half of the 20th century, the world was in a state of
excitement. The reason was that the white government of an African country had just
announced the discharge of a prominent freedom ￿ghter with a history within the South
African ANC. After decades of tireless struggle for freedom and majority rule, he was con-
vincingly elected to lead his country. Despite past grievances, he advocated reconciliation
between blacks and whites upon assuming presidency - a position that he started to ful￿ll
with success. This didn￿ t go unnoticed and the freedom-￿ghter-turned-politician was soon
inundated with international honours (including a knighthood by Queen Elizabeth II in
1994). His name, however, wasn￿ t Nelson Mandela. It was Robert Mugabe.
Anno 2014 the above paragraph may be hard to believe, but upon installation in
1980 (and even during his early years) Mugabe was regarded as a benevolent and highly
competent ruler of his country - a view that was widely shared among Zimbabweans, non-
Zimbabweans, and international organizations.1 During the 1980s, Mugabe￿ s government
also achieved impressive successes: the country saw double-digit growth rates, high school
enrolment rates increased from 2 percent to 70 percent, while literacy rates rose from 45
percent to 80 percent. Because of his contributions to reconciliation, Mugabe was even
short-listed for the Nobel Peace Prize in the 1980s (Nordlinger, 2012: 243).
By the late 2000s, however, things had gone horribly wrong: over 90 percent of all
Zimbabweans were unemployed, a ￿fth of them HIV-positive, and about 25 percent of
the population had ￿ ed the country to look for a better life elsewhere. Many of those
remaining in Zimbabwe lived under great fear and repression, with Mugabe stating in a
2003 speech that he would act like "a black Hitler tenfold" against any opposition. In
order to ￿nance the military, excessive money creation made in￿ ation soar to 231 million
percent in 2008. Meanwhile, life expectancy for Zimbabwean men fell from 58 years in
1991 to 45 years in 2006. Female life expectancy nearly halved from 61 years in 1991 to
no more than 34 years in 2006 (Holland, 2008: xxi).
1On September 5 1986, The New York Times for example wrote in an editorial that "Zimbabwe under
Mr. Mugabe￿ s leadership remains one of Africa￿ s success stories (...) His sensible economic policies have
kept the country￿ s key agricultural sector healthy. His responsible treatment of the white remnants of
colonial Rhodesia has checked the ￿ ight of a skilled minority. Even the debilitating relations between
black tribes seem to be less tense". When Mugabe won the Hunger Project Prize in 1988, he was
credited with turning Zimbabwe into the "agricultural success story" of Africa, with his agricultural
programs "[pointing] the way not only for Zimbabwe but for the entire African continent".
2In this paper, we ask how it is possible that someone who looked to be a promising
ruler during his early years,2 subsequently became such a dreaded tyrant. This seems to
be a pattern: next to the curious case of Robert Mugabe, there are many more examples
of leaders who started out in a promising manner but later turned into the most vicious
dictators. Some notable cases include:
￿ Caligula: when he accepted the powers of Principate in 37 AD, he made a promising
start by reintroducing elections for magistrates, by aiding those who lost property in
￿res, and by recalling Senators who were unjustly sent into exile by his predecessor
Tiberius.3 But some two years into his reign, Caligula turned into one of the most
vicious and oppressive dictators that the Roman Empire would ever see (for example
executing people for criticizing the way he dressed).4 "Let them hate me, as long
as they fear me" allegedly became his motto. While some scholars hypothesize
that only a mental illness can be to blame for this mutation, others disagree and
believe that Caligula remained a rational and calculating individual throughout (see
Winterling (2011)). In this paper, we will indeed show that it does not take a mental
illness to bring about such a remarkable deterioration in behavior.
￿ Kwame Nkrumah: after gaining a PhD from the LSE, returning home and serving
time as a political prisoner, Nkrumah was elected Prime Minister of Gold Coast
(present day Ghana) in 1952. His successful policies (which included the construc-
tion of many schools and hospitals, and nearly doubling the country￿ s literacy rate)
made him very popular. However, from 1954 onwards, things started to change:
when cocoa prices rose from £150 to £450 per ton, Nkrumah refused to pass any
of the gain on to farmers - increasing export duties instead. This policy of rent ex-
traction led to bloody clashes and riots, which Nkrumah answered with repression.
In 1958 he passed a law that allowed imprisonment without trial, while he declared
2That is not to say that Mugabe had a ￿ awless start. While the consensus view is that he did more
good than harm during the ￿rst ten years of his reign, it certainly was not all good from the beginning:
he for example already repressed certain political opponents during the 1980s (see especially Godwin
(2010)), although it has been argued that the underlying con￿ ict was actually fuelled by external forces
(South Africa￿ s apartheid regime in particular, see footnote 9 below). What does seem undisputed is that
Mugabe￿ s behavior deteriorated signi￿cantly over time, which is the focus of this paper.
3The Roman historian Flavius Josephus wrote that Caligula "administered the Empire quite high-
mindedly during the ￿rst and second years of his reign. By exercising moderation he made great advances
in popularity both with the Romans themselves and with their subjects" (Antiquitates Judaicae (18.256)).
4Grabsky (1997, Ch. 3) attributes a similar development to Nero (who ruled from 54 to 68 AD): while
he did very well for the Roman Empire in the ￿rst ￿ve years of his reign, Nero subsequently faced violent
protests - sparked by the tax increases that he implemented to ￿nance the construction of his "Golden
House". This allegedly turned him into an oppressive tyrant.
3himself "President for life" in 1964. When he was overthrown in 1966, this was
greeted with great enthusiasm among the Ghanaian population. Back then, The
New York Times re￿ ected on the excesses of his dictatorship and concluded that
Nkrumah had at some stage crossed "a point of no return".
￿ Ferdinand Marcos: during his ￿rst term as President of the Philippines (which
began in 1965), Marcos made signi￿cant progress on agriculture, industry, and ed-
ucation and was generally well-regarded - also internationally.5 In the run-up to his
second electoral victory in 1969 he campaigned on the success of his "rice, roads
and schools" program. Yet, in the early 1970s, his administration faced violent
insurgencies from those who were dissatis￿ed with ongoing corruption (Mijares,
1986). In response to these protests, Marcos imposed martial law in 1972 and used
the opportunity to eliminate his main political rivals. Marcos￿later years in power
were characterised by heavy repression (through political detainments, tortures, and
killings), cronyism, and even greater corruption. He was forced to ￿ ee the country
in 1986 and lived in exile in Hawaii until his death in 1989.
￿ Bashar al-Assad: succeeding his father as President of Syria in 2000, this London-
trained eye doctor made a promising start. He released over 600 political prisoners,
closed the notorious "Mezzeh prison" (turning it into an institute for historical sci-
ence), and relaxed limits to freedom of expression by tolerating critical media and
permitting the use of mobile phones and internet. Consequently, many observers
spoke of the "Damascus Spring" (cf. Human Rights Watch (2007, Ch. 3)). This
Spring however turned out to be short-lived, as the regime had turned more repres-
sive than ever by 2005.6 With the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Assad￿ s
behavior has continued to worsen (the suspected use of chemical weapons against
his own population in 2013 is only one example of this).
While the above list is far from exhaustive (similar deteriorations in behavior have
been attributed to Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, to Alberto Fujimori of Peru, and to
Muammar Gadda￿of Libya) history also o⁄ers examples of dictators who started o⁄in an
unpromising (and even malevolent) manner, but showed remarkable improvements in their
actions over time. The archetype along these lines is Ghana￿ s Jerry Rawlings (Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith, 2011: 218-222). Immediately after taking power in December 1981,
5For example, on November 19, 1967 The New York Times wrote that Marcos "in his ￿rst two years
in o¢ ce has laid the beginnings of a breakthrough toward agricultural self-su¢ ciency by use of improved
seed strains and construction of rural roads".
6See e.g. "The Enigma of Damascus" in The New York Times of July 10, 2005.
4he began a wave of oppression through killings, arrests, and torture, while he simulta-
neously ended free press. Subsequently, however, Rawlings was rapidly confronted with
rising unrest among the local population (as well as with pressure from the international
community), which turned him into, what Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2011: 222)
call, "a reluctant democrat". Notwithstanding his questionable motives, Rawlings had
become a poster boy for the IMF and World Bank by the early 1990s and was credited
with playing a key role in Ghana￿ s process of development and democratization. In De-
cember 2000, Rawlings stepped down per his own constitutional mandate (he had served
for two terms already) and made room for the democratically elected John Kufuor, his
main rival and opponent in the 1996 election. In doing so, Rawlings established the ￿rst
peaceful transition of power in Ghana since the country￿ s independence in 1957.7
Again, Rawlings is not the only case of a dictator whose behavior mutated for the
better. Other examples include:
￿ Kenneth Kaunda: upon taking power in Zambia in 1964, Kaunda unveiled himself
as a repressive autocrat. By 1972 he had transformed Zambia into a one-party state
and from 1976 onwards he even governed through emergency rule. During the 1980s,
however, swayed by anti-government demonstrations, Kaunda￿ s regime became less
repressive and in 1990 it eventually legalized opposition parties. After losing the
multiparty 1991 elections, Kaunda peacefully handed power to the election-winner
Frederick Chiluba. Since then, Kaunda has received many awards for his contri-
butions towards the development of Zambia, including numerous honorary doctor-
ates, the second Ubuntu Award (the ￿rst recipient being Nelson Mandela), and
the African President-in-Residence Fellowship at Boston University. Commenting
upon that honour, The New York Times wrote on November 13, 2002 that Kaunda
"would not have been eligible if the fellowship had been around thirty years ago,
around the time he banned multiparty politics. Over the years, however, he became
a democrat."
￿ Daniel arap Moi: his Presidency of Kenya can also be divided in two parts. The early
period from 1978 until 1991 is typically characterized as a time of heavy corruption
7On Rawlings￿remarkable story, also see The Guardian of January 5, 2001. There it is written that
"in 1981 Jerry Rawlings gained power in a coup. For years (...) he allowed opponents to be persecuted
and murdered. Then at the beginning of the 90s, he changed. He allowed democratic elections and gave
citizens a liberal constitution. This has now prevented him from holding o¢ ce for a third term. And [he]
kept to this". Similarly The New York Times of January 9, 2009 notes that "Africa￿ s vast stage has seen
many complex players, but few match the contradictions of Mr. Rawlings, the ruthless military man who
seized power at the age of 31 and then oversaw the summary executions of his rivals, only to later usher
in a new era of prosperity and democracy. Mr. Rawlings (...) was an unlikely savior".
5and repression, while the later phase from 1992 until 2002 is seen as a period during
which his behavior improved: he reduced the amount of repression, restored the
multiparty system, and loosened restrictions on freedom of speech. Being barred
from reelection in 2002 (by his own 1992 constitutional change), Moi chose not to
amend the constitution but gave his support to Uhuru Kenyatta instead. When
the latter faced electoral defeat by Mwai Kibaki, Moi transferred power peacefully
nevertheless. The improvement in Moi￿ s behavior is attributed to a combination of
both internal resistance (most notably the "Saba Saba uprising" of July 1990), as
well as to reduced US support for Moi￿ s anti-communist regime (which became of
less strategic interest after the collapse of the USSR; see e.g. FES (2003)).
￿ Chun Doo-hwan: upon taking power in South Korea through a military coup in 1979,
General Chun￿ s initial period of control was extremely brutal. He imposed martial
law, banned all political activity, and censored the media. In May 1980, Chun
oversaw the "Gwangju massacre", where several hundred protesters were killed by
government troops. Subsequently, his behaviour improved: he lifted martial law
in 1981 and wrote a new constitution limiting the President￿ s term to 7 years. In
the following year he removed a longstanding curfew, released political prisoners,
and lifted the ban on political activities. These moves led to a resurrection of
violent activism, but this time Chun did not declare martial law: he relied upon
riot police rather than the military to deal with the protesters, apparently wishing
to avoid another massacre (Kim, 2007). Adhering to his own constitution, Chun
stepped down in 1988 and transferred power to the election-winner Roe Tae-woo,
who became South Korea￿ s ￿rst democratically elected President.
This paper presents a new theory (focused on explaining the use of repression) which
is able to rationalize these remarkable mutations - both for the better, as well as for the
worse. We will show that such transformations can arise without having to allude to a
sudden exogenous change in the dictator￿ s preferences through a mysterious mental illness
(which is for example often done in the case of Caligula).
In our model, citizens are able to oust a dictator via a revolution, but the dictator
can reduce the probability of being overthrown by exercising repression (which can take
the form of restricting freedom of speech, imprisoning or executing opponents, and so
forth). Particularly motivated by recent events in Northern Africa, where various dictators
were overthrown, we allow revolutions to succeed. Herewith, we relax the often-made
assumption that revolutions do not occur in equilibrium (see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006, Ch. 6, 11) and Guimaraes and Sheedy (2013) on this assumption).
6The key notion underlying our results is a complementarity between a dictator￿ s ￿ ow-
use of repression and his "stock of past wrongdoings" (a novel concept that plays a central
role in our model): when a dictator has committed wrongs in the past (of whatever form),
he fears retribution for these bygone o⁄ences once overthrown and he becomes more willing
to use repression (so as to reduce his probability of being ousted, and hence punished).8
Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests that this mechanism has played an important role
in explaining the use of repression for many of the aforementioned cases. Asked what
has happened to Mugabe￿ s heart, his ex-spin doctor Jonathan Moyo for example notes
that "Gukurahundi9 (...) is hanging over Robert Mugabe￿ s head, partly explaining his
desire - or his need - to continue in o¢ ce until he dies" (Holland, 2008: 183). For similar
reasons, Godwin (2010: 122) highlights the view that Mugabe is a "prisoner of his own
past", while Godwin also quotes the Zimbabwean politician Roy Bennett as saying that
"[Gukurahundi] remains Mugabe￿ s biggest motive for holding on to power: he fears that if
he leaves o¢ ce he will become victim to (...) retributive justice, the real blood-revenge."
We will show that such stock-￿ ow complementarity in wrongdoings leads to the emer-
gence of two steady states: one is characterized by light repression, while the other steady
state comes with heavy repression. As a result, our model can give rise to both remarkable
improvements in dictator-behavior, as well as to signi￿cant deteriorations. Interestingly,
this also implies that any individual rising to power in our model environment has the po-
tential to end up as either a moderate leader, or as a dreaded tyrant - thereby identifying
a new form of "the banality of evil".
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out our model and
describes its key properties, after which Section 3 will explain how this setup can give
rise to signi￿cant mutations in dictator-behavior. In doing so, we will discuss the factors
that determine whether a particular ruler will develop into a moderate leader, or into a
vicious tyrant. Section 4 then analyzes some policy implications, after which Sections 5
and 6 will discuss and conclude, respectively.
8Egorov and Sonin (2005) identify a related complementarity, which could add to the one underlying
this paper: they note that a ruthless start of dictator A (which could for example include the execution
of his predecessor Z) will give him a bad name, as a result of which A may get lynched himself once
he is overthrown by a new dictator (B) who fears A￿ s cruel reputation. This may make A￿ s reign more
repressive in order to prevent such a displacement. So as Friedrich Nietzsche already noted, one should
"beware that, when ￿ghting monsters, you do not become a monster yourself".
9"Gukurahundi" refers to the killing of supporters of Mugabe￿ s rival Joshua Nkomo during the 1980s
for which Mugabe is held responsible. There is evidence that this con￿ ict was actually fuelled by South
Africa￿ s apartheid regime in an attempt to destabilize Zimbabwe (as the South African government at the
time was working to undermine post-apartheid-regimes). See e.g. "Apartheid￿ s Spies" in The Washington
Post of October 22, 1989.
72 Model
Our model has an in￿nite horizon, is set in discrete time, and hosts an incumbent, non-
accountable dictator who discounts the future with factor ￿. As argued in Maskin and
Tirole (2004), such non-accountable dictators are inclined to act in a way that is non-
congruent with the preferences of society. The reason is that the absence of an election
mechanism implies that the public has relatively little means available through which it
can ensure that the dictator acts in the public - as opposed to his private - interest (apart
from trying to remove a misbehaving dictator via a revolution, which is an option that
we discuss below). We model the non-congruence by assuming that the dictator obtains
utility u(ct) by extracting ct rents from his country (for example through corruption).
This is similar to Besley (2004: 201), who models non-congruent policy makers as ones
who "obtain private bene￿ts from deviating from the voters￿preferred policy", for example
because they are "willing to accept bribes". Simultaneously, however, such rent extraction
creates discontent among the population, and may even trigger a revolution (see below).10
Next to his private consumption level ct, the dictator also controls the amount of
repression that he is going to impose upon his population (rt).11 Exercising such repression
makes the aforementioned revolution less likely to succeed.
The amount of divertible funds available to the dictator in any period is denoted by z.
These funds can for example stem from the exploitation of natural resources, or from the
reception of fungible development aid. We take z to be constant over time, as making it
stochastic or time-varying does not yield many interesting insights (but see Section 4 for
some comparative statics with respect to this variable). The dictator￿ s budget constraint
is then given by (we assume that the relative price equals unity, but this is of course
10More generally, one can think of rent extraction in our model as representing any non-congruent policy
that the dictator wants to pursue for private reasons, even though it generates dissatisfaction among the
population. As argued in Svolik (2012: 10), pursuing policies through which public consent is lost, always
tends to be the "original sin" of dictatorships. Our speci￿c framing is motivated by the observation that
many leaders in reality started to lose popularity because of rent extraction (not directly because of
repression). The most notable examples are those of the Roman Emperor Nero (who lost credit when
he increased taxes to ￿nance his "Golden House"), Kwame Nkrumah (he expropriated cocoa farmers,
which led to violent insurgencies against his regime), and Ferdinand Marcos (the ￿rst protests that he
faced, the so-called "First Quarter Storm", were triggered by the corruption in his government). Robert
Mugabe is an exception along this dimension, as his early years in o¢ ce were not overly corrupt (he even
used to hand back unused foreign currency when returning from international trips, see Godwin (2010:
25)). Mugabe however began to lose popularity through Gukurahundi (recall footnote 9).
11Besley and Persson (2011) distinguish between "repression" (which they de￿ne as the government
using one-sided violence against a non-violent opposition) and "civil war" (in which case the opposition
answers by using violence as well). Since we do not need to take a stand on the nature of the opposition
(violent or non-violent?), this distinction becomes of subordinate importance to our model. Our model
does distinguish between "peace" on the one hand, and "repression/civil war" on the other though.
8without loss of generality):
ct + rt ￿ z (1)
Since we are not interested in explaining asset accumulation of dictators, we keep the
model as simple (and parsimonious in terms of state variables) as possible by denying the
dictator the opportunity to save any of his period endowment (but this assumption is not
material to any of our results).
Once citizens ￿nd it worthwhile to revolt (a decision that we will discuss shortly), the
dictator faces a probability pt = p(rt) > 0 of being ousted in period t. This function
satis￿es dp(rt)=drt < 0, capturing the idea that a dictator can reduce the probability of
being overthrown at time t by repressing his population during that period.
Both the consumption of rents c as well as the use of repression r however generate
dissatisfaction among the population. By carrying out such activities, a dictator may
therefore trigger the start of a revolution, while he may also face corresponding punishment
(if overthrown). Consequently, the combined stock of exercised repression and extracted
rents (S) is going to serve as a state variable. We refer to this novel concept as the
dictator￿ s "stock of wrongdoings" and it evolves according to:
St+1 = ￿St + rt + ￿ct (2)
Here ￿ 2 (0;1) governs the depreciation rate (a lower value for ￿ implies that past
wrongdoings are forgiven (or forgotten) at a faster pace),12 while ￿ is the exchange rate
converting units of rent extraction into units of repression (when ￿ < 1 extracting a unit
of rents is seen as less malicious than exercising a unit of repression, and vice versa).
This state variable plays a dual role in our model. Firstly, once overthrown a dictator is
punished according to the unforgotten/unforgiven stock of malicious activities undertaken
in the past. Secondly, citizens will use the accumulated stock S to determine whether
they ￿nd it worthwhile to start a revolution against the incumbent dictator.13
12In reality, ￿ seems to be smaller than 1. This is partly due to statutes of limitations, where legal
proceedings can only occur within a limited time period. More generally, however, crimes seem to be
forgiven/forgotten over time: recall how Muammar Gadda￿ was re-embraced by many countries in the
early 2000s, while Rawlings, Moi, and many others were never prosecuted for their past alleged misdeeds
(not even in retirement). The ordinary public also seems to forgive/forget: cf. how Joseph Stalin￿ s
popularity among Russians has risen with time, while Kwame Nkrumah was voted "Africa￿ s man of the
millennium" in 2000 - despite being hated when he was ousted.
13One could also introduce a third role for S by using a more general ousting probability function of
the form p(St;rt), with @p(St;rt)=@St > 0. This would capture the idea that the public becomes more
eager to bring about regime change, or that a larger fraction of the population joins the revolution, if the
dictator￿ s accumulated stock of wrongdoings is bigger. For simplicity we employ p(rt), but our results
are fully robust to using the more general p(St;rt).
9In particular, let us use S￿ to denote the value of S beyond which (part of) the
population starts a revolution.14 We use this term very broadly here and allow it to
encompass all activities that citizens can undertake with the aim of overthrowing the
incumbent. These activities could be either violent or non-violent, so "opposition" is
another appropriate label. With some abuse of terminology, we will call the point S￿
"the Mogadishu line".15 From that point onwards, the dictator faces a period ousting
probability equal to p(rt), which he can reduce by exercising repression (remember that
dp(rt)=drt < 0 and recall that our results are robust to using the more general function
p(St;rt), with @p(St;rt)=@St > 0 and @p(St;rt)=@rt < 0; cf. footnote 13).
The fact that the revolution only starts once St > S￿, results from the notion that
individuals need to pay a ￿xed start-up cost to form an opposition-movement.16 This
feature of our model ensures that dictators can get away with some wrongdoing, which
seems to be in line with reality: a revolution only arises once the public￿ s assessment of
the dictator gets "bad enough".17 Agents in our model thus look at a dictator￿ s past per-
formance in determining whether they ￿nd it worthwhile to revolt, which seems realistic
and is somewhat analogous to the concept of retrospective voting (and note that such
backward-looking behavior is not necessarily inconsistent with rationality; cf. Rogo⁄and
Sibert (1988), Rogo⁄ (1990), and Alesina and Cukierman (1990)).
The exact location of the Mogadishu line S￿, a tipping point beyond which a revolution
mobilizes, is however unknown to the dictator (and see Kuran (1989) for evidence that
14If we were to microfound S￿, this would be the level of S beyond which it would be optimal for citizens
to start revolting, taking all future possibilities (which include derailment, disciplining, and ousting of the
dictator) into account. Since modeling this group-decision is non-trivial due to the presence of a collective-
action problem (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: Ch. 5) and a need to specify how the public believes that
the dictator will react to any opposition, we take a short-cut here - choosing to highlight (and microfound)
the behavior of the dictator instead. For our mechanism to operate, the only important element is that
there is a threshold - how exactly it comes about is of subordinate importance. Most existing models of
revolutions, such as the seminal ones by Roemer (1985), Grossman (1991), and Wintrobe (1998), take a
similar approach on this dimension.
15Formally, the concept of "the Mogadishu line" refers to the point where a foreign power abandons a
pure peacekeeping mission in a particular country and begins combat operations instead, often with the
aim of bringing about regime change. In this paper, we will use the term more generally so that it also
includes the mobilization of a local opposition that wants to overthrow the incumbent regime.
16See e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (1999), Cabrales and Hauk (2011), and Fearon (2011) for similar
models. One could also allow for an exogenous positive probability of the dictator losing power while
St < S￿ without a⁄ecting our results. That speci￿cation would make this case correspond to the state
of peace identi￿ed by Besley and Persson (2011): in their peace-regime there is also no repression or
revolution occurring, but the incumbent does face an exogenous probability of losing power.
17American "Founding Father" John Adams already noted this in his Papers, where he wrote that
"people are so little attentive to government that there are no instances of resistance until repeated,
multiplied oppressions have placed it beyond a doubt that their rulers had formed settled plans to deprive
them of their liberties" (Adams, 1977 [1775]: 231).
10the locations of such tipping points are indeed surrounded by uncertainty). Consequently,
the dictator is unsure about how much of the non-congruent policy (in our speci￿c setup:
how much rent extraction) he can get away with. The position of S￿ is only revealed
to him once his actual stock St crosses S￿, as he then observes the mobilization of an
opposition-movement against him. If he observes no opposition at time t, the dictator
learns that S￿ > St and he updates his prior belief on the location of S￿ accordingly using
Bayes￿rule. Summarizing the dictator￿ s prior belief about the location of S￿ with his
subjective probability distribution (characterized by the c.d.f. F(S￿)) this implies that if
S￿ has not yet been reached at the point where the stock of wrongdoings equals S, the
distribution is updated to F 0(S￿) via (see Zeira (1987, 1999)):
F
0(S
￿) =
F(S￿) ￿ F(S)
1 ￿ F(S)
(3)
Without loss of generality, we will take F (￿) to be the uniform c.d.f.
In this paper we model S￿ as being exogenous, but this is not essential. One could for
example also endogenize S￿ by making it depend on r, without a⁄ecting the core ￿ndings
that are to follow. All that matters for the main results is that there is a threshold S￿
and that its exact location is unknown.
As a result of our model￿ s information structure, the dictator￿ s behavior is charac-
terized by two value functions. After the dictator has crossed the Mogadishu line S￿, its
location is revealed through the start of a visible revolution and the learning process stops.
Assuming that the opposition-movement stays active ever after it has incurred the ￿xed
start-up cost, crossing the tipping point is an irreversible event and the "post-tipping"
value function V1 is given by:
V1(S) = u(c) ￿ p(r)￿(S) + [1 ￿ p(r)]￿V1(S
0); (4)
where non-primed variables refer to the current period, while primed variables apply
to the next period. If the dictator is ousted in the current period (which happens with
probability p(r)), he incurs a punishment ￿ which is increasing in his accumulated stock
of unforgiven/unforgotten wrongdoings (so d￿(S)=dS > 0).
As long as S < S￿ the dictator hasn￿ t crossed the Mogadishu line yet, so he is uncertain
on the exact location of S￿. The dictator therefore uses his beliefs F (S￿) to construct
expected values. The pre-tipping value function V0 can then be written as:
V0(S;F) = u(c) + ￿ [(1 ￿ q(S
0;S))V0(S
0;F
0) + q(S
0;S)V1(S
0;F
0)]; (5)
11where q(S0;S) expresses the dictator￿ s belief that S￿ is located in the (S;S0)-interval
(i.e. that S￿ 2 (S;S0)). This belief is de￿ned by:
q(S
0;S) ￿ Pr[S
￿ 2 (S;S
0)] = F(S
0) ￿ F(S) (6)
Hence, q(S0;S) represents the subjective probability that the dictator attaches to
switching to the post-tipping regime if he chooses to set next period￿ s stock of accumu-
lated wrongdoings equal to S0 (with his current stock being equal to S). Through this
mechanism a dictator realizes that by committing any wrongs in the current period, he
loses popularity and hence increases the probability that he will be ousted in the future.18
A crucial element to note from the post-tipping value function V1 (equation (4)),
is that the stock of wrongdoings and the ￿ ow of repression are complements. De￿ning
g(c;r;S) ￿ u(c) ￿ p(r)￿(S) as the dictator￿ s period felicity function in the post-tipping
regime, it holds that:
@2g(c;r;S)
@r@S
= ￿
dp(r)
dr
d￿(S)
dS
> 0; (7)
as dp(r)=dr < 0 (a dictator can reduce the probability with which he is ousted by
exercising repression), while d￿(S)=dS > 0 (punishment is increasing in the stock of
accumulated wrongdoings). Consequently, marginal utility from exercising repression is
higher for a dictator with a large stock of wrongdoings hanging over his head - thereby
making it more likely that such a dictator will do further wrongs (in the form of repressing
his population, as that reduces the probability that he will indeed face punishment).
As shown analytically in a general setup by Orphanides and Zervos (1994), and illus-
trated in Figure 1 for our particular model, this complementarity leads to a discontinuity
in the dictator￿ s post-tipping policy function (we denote the location of the discontinuity
by SD). This level SD is going to act like a critical point in our model (see Section 3) and
generates two steady states for the stock of wrongdoings S in the post-tipping regime.
Intuition for this multiplicity can be gained by realizing that all that the dictator
cares about, is the product p(r)￿(S) (recall equation (4)). Due to the complementarity
between S and r, there is one steady state where both S and r are high (the former
making prospective punishment ￿(S) high, while the latter reduces the probability of it
actually materializing p(r) - such that the product p(r)￿(S) remains contained). The
other steady state is characterized by the co-existence of a low S and r. In that case,
prospective punishment ￿(S) is already low, as a result of which there is no need to ensure
18Niccol￿ Machiavelli also alluded to this in The Prince, where he wrote: "Never do any enemy a small
injury for they are like a snake which is half beaten and it will strike back the ￿rst chance it gets".
12a low p(r) by setting a high r.
As pointed out by Orphanides and Zervos (1995), analytical results are scarce in these
kind of models but progress can be made by analyzing limit cases. For our setting, a
useful limit case is the one in which a dictator holds the belief that there is no tipping
point. In that case, our optimization problem becomes purely static and can be solved
analytically. Since the dictator in this case believes that there is absolutely no chance
that he will ever be overthrown via a revolution (either now or in the future), he will
always choose to exhaust his budget constraint (2) by setting c = z. The accompanying
steady-state stock equals S
U
= ￿z=(1￿￿), where the superscript U indicates that this is
the unconstrained steady state.
 
Figure 1: Illustration of two steady states in the post-tipping policy function for u(c) =
log(c), p(r) = 1
1+exp(￿r); ￿(S) = S; ￿ = 0:95; ￿ = 0:6; ￿ = 0:6; ￿ = 0:073; and z = 50.
A decision maker who believes that there may exist an unpleasant tipping point at
some bounded location (i.e. someone who believes that S￿ < 1 is possible, but is unsure
on its exact position), will behave more cautiously (see Zeira (1987) and imagine the
speed at which a blind man would walk towards his goal if he knew that there might
be a cli⁄ somewhere in front of him). In our environment, this implies that the dictator
13will choose to extract less rents in the pre-tipping regime compared to the unconstrained
case, increasing his stock S only little-by-little as he is afraid to cross S￿ (such caution
is also apparent from Figures 2 and 3 below). Due to this more cautious behavior, the
model will settle down at a lower steady state S
C
< S
U
. It is not possible to solve for this
"constrained" steady state S
C
analytically, but it can be found numerically. The dotted
line in Figure 1 shows its location given parameters. The constrained steady state S
C
is useful as it characterizes the limit behavior of any dictator who becomes increasingly
optimistic that the possibility of a revolution is not going to generate a binding constraint
on him (i.e.: a dictator who starts to put more and more weight on the possibility that
S￿ > S
C
). Once his stock St reaches S
C
(without having triggered a revolution), the
system will settle down at this steady state.19
3 Simulation results
Now that we have set out our model, we can gain further insights by simulating the choices
that a dictator who is placed in this environment will make. As will become clear below,
the relative ranking of the critical point (SD) and the Mogadishu line (S￿) becomes a key
determinant of how the dictator will act. Consequently, we distinguish between two cases.
Case I: SD < S￿. First consider Figure 2. The solid line in the top panel of this ￿gure
shows the outcome of a typical simulation when the Mogadishu line S￿ is greater than the
critical point SD (but smaller than S
C
, so SD < S￿ < S
C
).20 The solid line shows that,
even though the dictator is not fully benevolent from the start due to his non-congruent
preferences,21 his behavior is still quite moderate during his early days (especially if one
considers what is about to follow). This characterization ￿ts the aforementioned cases
of Robert Mugabe, Ferdinand Marcos, and many others who were not perfect when they
￿rst came to power, but looked bearable at least.
19To avoid clutter, Figure 1 does not contain the pre-tipping policy functions for dictators who believe
that either S￿ = 1 or that S￿ < 1. They are however just two continuous, upward-sloping lines crossing
the 45o-line at S
U
and S
C
, respectively.
20Whenever S￿ > S
C
, the tipping point is "non-binding" and the dictator is able to reach his con-
strained steady state S
C
without triggering a revolution. This case is illustrated by the dotted, circled
curve in Figure 2 (this curve is actually more visible in Figure 3 below).
21Given our framing, the dictator starts by extracting rents. But as explained in footnote 10, one can
think of ct as representing any policy that the dictator wants to pursue for private reasons - even though
it creates dissatisfaction among the public. It could also be the case that external circumstances make
a dictator believe (rightly or wrongly) that he is somehow forced to take a non-congruent action. Some
might argue that this was the case for Robert Mugabe around Gukurahundi (recall footnote 9).
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Figure 2: Evolution of key variables when SD < S￿. Parameters as in Figure 1.
Uncertain on where exactly the Mogadishu line S￿ is located (and hence uncertain
on how much wrongdoing he can get away with before mobilizing the opposition), the
dictator continues in pursuing his non-congruent interest. As can be inferred from the
bottom panel of Figure 2, the wrongdoings in the pre-tipping regime consist entirely of
rent extraction (the di⁄erence between the solid and the dashed line in Figure 2￿ s bottom
panel equals ￿ct, which is rent extraction converted to units of repression); there is no
repression yet. The reason is that in the model￿ s current formulation, repression only
starts delivering bene￿ts after the opposition has mobilized. Consequently, a dictator will
never exercise any repression as long as his stock S < S￿ and our model starts out in a
state of peace. One could let a dictator exercise repression while S < S￿ by assuming
that any pre-tipping use of repression pushes up the location of S￿, or by considering a
sadistic ruler for whom rt enters directly into his utility function (see under Case II below).
Those versions of the model yield similar results. In this paper, we would however like to
emphasize that even non-sadistic rulers can end up as vicious tyrants.
From the top panel in Figure 2 one can also see how the dictator￿ s behavior is mod-
erated by his belief that there may exist a binding tipping point (recall the discussion at
15the end of Section 2 and compare the start of the solid line in Figure 2￿ s top panel with
the dashed line, which would materialize if the dictator was certain that there was no
tipping point). As the revolution fails to materialize, our dictator becomes increasingly
optimistic that he can get away with extracting even more rents and he continues with
his unlawful behavior.22 The dictator hopes to be able to reach his constrained steady
state S
C
without triggering a revolution by continuing along his initial path (this case is
illustrated by the dotted, circled curve in the top panel of Figure 2 and would materialize
if S￿ > S
C
, i.e. if the tipping point were "non-binding").23 But when his stock of wrong-
doings St eventually crosses S￿ nevertheless (in this example this happens just before S
C
is reached), the opposition-movement is mobilized and the dictator ￿nds himself in the
post-tipping regime.
As Figure 2 shows, the model then converges to the bad steady state, characterized
by heavy repression. The reason is that our dictator switches to the post-tipping policy
function (displayed in Figure 1) with a stock St > SD (this is guaranteed by Case I￿ s
de￿ning assumption that S￿ > SD). In that part of the state space, the bad steady state
is the stable point of attraction. Intuitively, our dictator has accumulated such a large
stock of wrongdoings that he fears retribution and has become "a prisoner of his own past"
who has crossed "a point of no return" (cf. the remarks that commentators have made
about Mugabe and Nkrumah in the Introduction to this paper). All the dictator can do
is hope to avoid serious punishment by clinging on to power, even though this requires
additional wrongdoings on his behalf (namely exercising repression). In this steady state,
a high stock of wrongdoings S (which implies a high prospective punishment ￿(S) for
the dictator) will be accompanied by heavy use of repression r (to reduce p, so that ￿(S)
is unlikely to materialize). With the ￿ ow use of repression and the stock of wrongdoings
being complements, the dictator ￿nds the established reduction in pt worthwhile, despite
the fact that his use of repression rt also adds to St+1 (which increases his problems even
further if he does get overthrown in the future). At this stage, the dictator can live with
being hated - as long as he is feared as well (recall Caligula￿ s quote in the Introduction
to this paper).
It is interesting to note that in our model the derailment of a dictator is unintentional
22Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests that this learning process on how far one can go, plays a role in
reality. Holland (2008: 66) for example describes how Robert Mugabe started to believe that "he could
get away with anything" after Gukurahundi was left unpunished.
23This does require the dictator￿ s initial subjective belief to be su¢ ciently optimistic such that he puts
some prior probability on the possibility that S￿ > S
C
. Given that many dictators su⁄er from a feeling
of "grandiosity" (Coolidge and Segal, 2009), such (over-)con￿dence in their ability to get away with some
wrongdoings is likely to be present in reality.
16and accompanied by ex-post regret (even though it results from fully rational behavior): if
the dictator had known the exact location of S￿, he never would have crossed this line. It
is thus the informational imperfection on the location of S￿ that opens up the possibility
to accidental derailment of the dictator.24
Anecdotal evidence supports the notion of ex-post regret. In Holland (2008: 121),
Denis Norman (an Englishman who has spent a total of twelve years in Robert Mugabe￿ s
cabinet, but subsequently distanced himself from the regime) recalls a private conversation
that he had with Mugabe in 2003 (during which Mugabe had little incentive to lie).
Norman asked him "Where did it all go wrong?", to which Mugabe replied: "Things
aren￿ t what they used to be, are they?". Mugabe subsequently re￿ ected upon the trips
that he and Norman used to make across the country (before things got out of hand),
adding "Those were good days, weren￿ t they? I really enjoyed it all back then."25
Case II: SD > S￿. Now consider Figure 3. As the two dashed lines in the top panel
of this ￿gure show, the model would converge to the exact same steady states as under
Case I if the dictator either knew that there is no tipping point (the dashed line converging
to S
U
) or if he did expect a tipping point at a bounded location but the tipping point
happens to be non-binding (the dashed-circled line converging to S
C
).
The solid line in the top panel shows a typical simulation when the tipping point is
binding (i.e.: S￿ < S
C
) and when the discontinuity SD is located to the right of the
Mogadishu line S￿ (S￿ < SD; this is the contrast with Case I). Here, the dictator learns
the location of the tipping point before his stock St has crossed the critical point at SD.
For the ￿rst few periods, while in the pre-tipping regime, this dictator makes the exact
same choices as under Case I. But since the opposition mobilizes relatively early in this
case (before the dictator has accumulated a stock of wrongdoings which exceeds SD), it
isn￿ t too late for him yet to improve his behavior upon learning the location of S￿. Under
24In this sense, our model is similar to the drug addiction-model of Orphanides and Zervos (1995): their
model produces drug addicts to whom addiction was unintentional and accompanied by ex-post regret. As
they note (p. 740), the crucial element to obtain this result is to do away with the assumption of perfect
foresight. Once that assumption is relaxed, models in which agents behave rationally can already produce
these kind of results. The same applies to our model: we have relaxed the perfect foresight-assumption
by introducing uncertainty on the location of S￿, as a result of which the dictator is uncertain on how
much wrongdoing he can actually get away with, which seems realistic.
25In Godwin (2010: 122), Mugabe￿ s personal chaplain characterizes him as an unhappy ruler as well.
Such discontent is also apparent in the private notes of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, who inherited a
repressive regime from his father, Alexander III . After Bloody Sunday (22 January, 1905), he wrote in
his personal diary: "A painful day. There have been serious disorders in St. Petersburg because workmen
wanted to come up to the Winter Palace. Troops had to open ￿re in several places in the city; there were
many killed and wounded. God, how painful and sad."
17this case, the dictator switches to the post-tipping policy function with a stock St < SD.
In that area of the state space, the good steady state is the stable point of attraction
(recall Figure 1). So when S￿ < SD, the opposition manages to discipline the dictator.
This kind of behavior has been observed in reality around the cases of Jerry Rawlings
and many others, who turned into moderate leaders after their rather unpromising starts
were met with protests.
Note from the bottom panel of Figure 3 how in our baseline speci￿cation the dicta-
tor￿ s wrongdoings in the pre-tipping regime only consist of rent extraction (there is no
repression yet). As explained under Case I, this is due to our assumption that the dictator
is non-sadistic in a sense that he does not derive any direct pleasure from repressing his
population. After all, the whole point of Case I was to show that even such a non-sadistic
ruler can develop into a repressive tyrant.
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Figure 3: Evolution of key variables when SD > S￿. Parameters as in Figure 1.
But as some of the "bad-turned-good"-examples mentioned in the Introduction ar-
guably did show sadistic behavior during their early days (while Coolidge and Segal
(2009) also o⁄er psychological evidence that many dictators su⁄er from a sadistic person-
ality disorder), Figure 4 shows that that the reverse is possible as well: even sadists can
18be turned into behaving autocrats. We model sadism by modifying the dictator￿ s utility
function to u(ct;rt) = log(ct) + ￿log(rt), with ￿ > 0. As Figure 4￿ s bottom panel shows,
such a dictator starts repressing his population as of day 1 already (very much like Jerry
Rawlings), but he still ends up as a moderate leader because his unpromising start triggers
opposition before his stock of wrongdoings S has crossed the "point of no return", SD.
Along these lines one should note that our model has nothing to say about the actual
democratization e⁄orts that were undertaken in practice by Rawlings et al. (also see
Section 5 on this, as this is a logical extension for future research). Our model can however
explain why those regimes moderated their use of political violence and repression, which
is the focus of this particular paper.
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Figure 4: Evolution of key variables when SD > S￿ and ￿ = 0:15. Other parameters as
in Figure 1.
Leap-frogging As Figure 5 illustrates, our model even allows for the possibility of
leap-frogging. The ￿gure simulates the behavior of two dictators, M and R. Let￿ s say
that these two dictators are concurrently running two di⁄erent countries. The di⁄erence
however is that Dictator R is intrinsically less benevolent than M. In particular, we
19assume that R￿ s preferences are less congruent with those of his citizens than M￿ s, while
we also assume that R is sadistic (while M is assumed not to be). We model this by
setting R￿ s preferences equal to uR(ct;rt) = ￿R log(ct) + ￿R log(rt), where ￿R > 1 (as a
result of which R is more inclined to extract rents from his country than M) and ￿R > 0
(this turns R into a sadist, taking direct pleasure in repressing subordinates). M￿ s utility
function on the other hand continues to be given by uM(ct;rt) = log(ct).
Another important di⁄erence is that we assume that the location of the Mogadishu
lines in the various countries is such that SD
R > S￿
R (as in Case II), while SD
M < S￿
M (so
Dictator M falls under Case I).26
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Figure 5: Evolution of key variables for Dictators M and R with ￿R = 1:1, ￿R = 0:15,
￿R = 0:99, ￿R = 0:35, and zR = 40. Other parameters as in Figure 1.
26Such a di⁄erence in the location of the S￿￿ s could for example stem from a lower start-up cost for
the opposition-movement in R￿ s country, than in M￿ s. Alternatively, it could also be driven by cultural
di⁄erences (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2014), or by a di⁄erence in the geographical structure of the two
countries. As for example argued in Campante, Do, and Guimaraes (2013), successful revolutions are
harder to organize in countries with isolated capital cities, as a result of which those countries will have
a higher S￿ (and dictators in those countries can get away with more wrongdoings, which is in line with
the empirical results reported by Campante et al.)
20As a result of ￿R > 1 and ￿R > 0, Dictator R makes a rather unpromising start -
repressing his population from day 1 and extracting large rents from the country. But
because he comes to face signi￿cant opposition before his stock of wrongdoings has crossed
SD, he does not end up in the repressive equilibrium where a high stock S has to be
accompanied by heavy repression r, but is disciplined instead. Dictator M, on the other
hand, walks the reverse route: he makes the better start of the two, but stoops to a
heavy use of repression later on - his non-sadistic preferences notwithstanding. So despite
the fact that R￿ s preferences are "worse" than M￿ s, and despite the fact that R makes a
rather unpromising start, he will still end up as the "better" autocrat. In this respect, our
model supports the wider notion that external circumstances are perhaps more important
in determining whether a particular individual will display "good" or "bad" behavior,
than intrinsic preferences.27
Leap-frogging does not seem to be merely a theoretical curiosity: when reading news-
paper accounts from the early 1980s, Jerry Rawlings is very much portrayed as the bad
guy, while Robert Mugabe was simultaneously being characterized as a relatively good
guy (even being considered for the Nobel Peace Prize). By the late 2000s, however, these
characterizations had ￿ ipped around: most of Mugabe￿ s international awards and hon-
ours had been revoked, while Rawlings suddenly found himself on the receiving end. Our
model is able to replicate such a reversal and suggests that it may have to do with the fact
that Rawlings soon faced opposition when he started exercising repression, while Mugabe
initially managed to get away with his ￿rst wrongdoings (most notably "Gukurahundi").
Summarizing As this section has shown, our model implies that the mobilization
of anti-government opposition has the potential to bring about a signi￿cant change to
a dictator￿ s behavior - either for the better, or for the worse. This seems to be in line
with reality. Holland (2008: 87, 171) and Meredith (2009: Ch. 8) for example describe
how Mugabe￿ s regime became more repressive after he started to feel the opposition by
the Zimbabwean Movement for Democratic Change. The Movement￿ s leader at the time,
Morgan Tsvangirai, seems to agree with this assessment. He has stated that "the turning
point of Mugabe was when he lost an election for the ￿rst time, when he lost the support
of the people, when it dawned on him the people no longer supported him. Then he
became reactionary. He reacted to the people￿ s will by enforcing his will on the people."28
27In very di⁄erent contexts, this idea is supported by many psychological experiments, such as the
Milgram Experiment and the Stanford Prison Experiment (see Milgram (1974) and Zimbardo (2007)).
28See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/mugabe-celebrates-90th-birthday-zimbabwe-
international-pariah.
21Similarly, the derailments of Kwame Nkrumah and Ferdinand Marcos were triggered by
them having to repress anti-government protests. At the same time, dictators like Jerry
Rawlings, Kenneth Kaunda, Daniel arap Moi, and Chun Doo-hwan were disciplined by the
mobilization of protesters against their regimes, which is in line with our model-outcome
under Case II.
This also has the provocative implication that any dictator operating in our environ-
ment has the potential to end up as either a moderate leader, or as a vicious tyrant.
Interestingly, even non-sadistic individuals who have absolutely no preference for exercis-
ing repression per se can already end up as repressive leaders (provided that their actions
are not fully congruent with the preferences of society, which seems to be the case in
reality - especially for non-accountable regimes (Maskin and Tirole, 2004)). This shines a
new light upon Hannah Arendt￿ s concept of "the banality of evil".29 Such a view is also
highlighted in Orizio (2004: 4) who quotes Ian McKellen as saying that "one of the few
lessons I have learned from studying people who do terrible things is that they are all too
human. And that we are all too capable of doing almost anything".
Our model ￿nally shows that something which at ￿rst sight appears to be a rather
minor non-congruence in preferences between the dictator and (a subset of) the public,
has the potential to escalate and lead to serious con￿ ict. Depending on the nature of the
opposition, even a di⁄erence in religion could already be enough to form the necessary
friction. For example: when the Muslim Brotherhood took over power in Egypt by ousting
Hosni Mubarak, his well-regarded Finance Minister Youssef Boutros Ghali was sentenced
in absentia to 30 years imprisonment and an 8.6 million dollar ￿ne for utilizing the Finance
Ministry￿ s printer for campaigning purposes, and his alleged personal use of impounded
cars. His trial lasted only 6 minutes and it is believed that Boutros Ghali￿ s Coptic-
Christian background played a role in his conviction.30 These examples could make leaders
who fear similar consequences more desperate in clinging on to power (even if they have
delivered high-quality work, as a result of which they should have nothing to fear on
objective legal grounds). When such leaders have the opportunity to do so, it may even
induce them to use repression in order to avoid an unfair trial. This actually seems to have
occurred in Bahrein, where King Hamad (who has, by most economic standards, done
quite well for his country since he came to power in 1999) recently repressed protests
29In her report on the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Arendt (1963) argues that ordinary people can already
commit serious atrocities if ordered to do so (Mulisch (1961) developed a comparable idea in his analysis
of the Eichmann-case, while Milgram￿ s (1974) "obedience experiment" provides some scienti￿c evidence).
Our model has a similar implication, but - unlike the Arendt/Mulisch/Milgram thesis - ours does not
rely upon subordinates obeying orders. Instead, our model focuses on the banality of evil at the very top.
30See http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Egypt-revolution-Mubarak-Ghali/2012/02/07/id/428738.
22that seemed at least partly motivated by religious di⁄erences (in Bahrein￿ s case a Sunni-
ruling family versus a Shia majority).31 Given that Hamad now has even more to worry
about if ousted, it is likely that he is willing to use repression again in the future to avoid
retribution for his past o⁄enses.
4 Policy implications
Our model also carries several policy implications. First and foremost, our model points
towards the importance of accountability when it comes to disciplining leaders. In envi-
ronments where leaders are more accountable, S￿ will be lower such that any behavior
which is non-congruent with the preferences of society is sooner met with opposition. As
set out in Section 3, this decreases the risk that the leader of such a country will derail
(especially recall Case II).
Secondly, it is also interesting to analyze the model￿ s comparative statics with respect
to z, the amount of divertible funds available to a dictator for rent extraction or repres-
sion. Such income can stem from the reception of fungible development aid or from the
exploitation of natural resources. As noted by Besley and Persson (2011: 1425), there is
a large empirical literature documenting the impact of resource rents on repression and
civil wars, but theoretical work is scarce (Aslaksen and Torvik (2006), Acemoglu, Ticchi,
and Vindigni (2010), Besley and Persson (2011), Acemoglu et al. (2012), Van der Ploeg
and Rohner (2012), and Van der Ploeg (2012) being some exceptions).
As illustrated by Figure 6, having a lower amount z of fungible resources available
increases the location of the critical level SD while simultaneously making the high-
repression steady state less repressive. Eventually, when z becomes low enough, this
steady state even ceases to exist. In that case, there is no risk of derailment anymore and
the low-repression steady state will be the unique (and stable) point of attraction. The
reason for these comparative statics is that when z is lower, the dictator is no longer able to
￿nance the high amount of repression that is necessary to sustain the very high-repression
steady states.
The fact that the location of the critical point SD is decreasing in z implies that
dictators with access to more divertible funds, are more likely to derail and develop into
repressive tyrants. It simultaneously also worsens the bad steady state (note how the latter
shifts right when z increases). This suggests that the availability of fungible resources
without proper checks-and-balances (remember that we condition on the dictator being
31Cf. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14540571.
23non-accountable) is conducive to the derailment of leaders. This can be seen as a new
and complementary form of the "resource curse".
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Figure 6: Impact of changes in z. Other parameters as in Figure 1.
This prediction is consistent with some existing empirical work (even though the lit-
erature does not seem to have reached a broad consensus on this issue yet; cf. Cotet
and Tsui (2013)): Besley and Persson (2011) report that exogenous aid in￿ ows result-
ing from either a natural disaster or UNSC membership during the Cold War, raise the
probability of political violence. For resource income, Lei and Michaels (2014) ￿nd that
oil￿eld discoveries increase the likelihood of armed con￿ ict, especially for countries that
have already seen such con￿ ict in the decade before the discovery. This result could be
due to our prediction that a dictator who has used violence in the past, is more likely to
use violence again in the future to avoid retribution for his past misdeeds. Finally, Wright
(2008) reports how dictators with shorter "time horizons" (for example because they face
a revolutionary threat) are more likely to abuse aid income as a means to stay in power.
The idea that the availability of divertible funds contributes to the derailment of dic-
tators, also lines up well with anecdotal evidence available for many of the aforementioned
examples. As discussed in the Introduction, Kwame Nkrumah￿ s Ghanaian government
24was well-funded in the mid-1950s via the revenues generated from the duties on cocoa-
exports. Comparable conditions have been documented for the Philippines, Libya, and
Romania. Marcos￿regime in the Philippines bene￿tted in the early 1970s from a four-
fold increase in the price of copra (the country￿ s main export product), while Libya and
Romania saw its leaders (Gadda￿and Ceausescu) derail in the 1970s, when their govern-
ments were well-endowed after having pro￿ted from increases in the oil price (with Libya
being an oil producer and Romania managing to generate "hard currency" during the
oil crisis by exporting re￿ned petroleum products; cf. Roper (2000: 55)). Similarly, it
has been reported that Mugabe￿ s government uses revenues generated by the exploitation
of diamond ￿elds for repressive purposes (giving rise to so-called "blood diamonds", see
Human Rights Watch (2009)).
An analogous pattern can be observed around fungible resources stemming from devel-
opment aid: Alberto Fujimori￿ s self-coup (which signaled the beginning of his repressive
days) took place less than a year after Peru had received a low-interest rate IMF-loan
(Hudson, 1993: 174), while Robert Mugabe￿ s behavior ￿rst deteriorated during the 1980s
- a decade in which his government was well-funded thanks to large aid in￿ ows.32 These
aid in￿ ows were meant to reward Mugabe for his benevolent behavior. Paradoxically, our
model however implies that through this reward-system, Mugabe￿ s promising start may
actually have contributed to his subsequent derailment (also see Meredith (2009: 81) who
recounts how Mugabe abused aid donations for purposes of repression).
At the same time, we already described in the Introduction how Daniel arap Moi￿ s
rule of Kenya became less repressive after the US reduced their aid ￿ ows to Moi￿ s regime
once it had become of less strategic interest following the collapse of the USSR.33
5 Discussion
This paper constitutes a ￿rst step in providing an answer to an intriguing question:
why have some promising, seemingly well-intentioned rulers turned into dreaded tyrants,
while some ruthless dictators have made the opposite journey? Several important matters
are left for future research. Most notably, our paper is very much focused at modeling
the behavior of a dictator in the face of a novel complementarity, namely that between
32From 1979 to 1984, foreign aid to Zimbabwe increased by a factor 32 (measured in 2011 dollars, it
went from 26 to 849 million dollars according to World Bank data). Over the same ￿ve year period, aid
to neighboring and similarly-populated Angola only doubled (it went from 120 to 285 million dollars).
33According to World Bank data, aid to Kenya fell from 2 billion dollars in 1989 to 442 million in 1999
(all measured in 2011 dollars) - a reduction of more than 75 percent.
25his stock of wrongdoings and his ￿ ow use of repression. This comes at the expense of
a less re￿ned representation of the institutional environment. Our model for example
abstracts from the intricate issues relating to the collective-action problems associated
with opposition-mobilizations,34 while it also takes the form of government (dictatorship)
as given. Consequently, it would be interesting to model the institutional framework as
well and investigate under what conditions autocrats can be made willing to share power.
This is the focus of Acemoglu and Robinson (1999, 2000, 2001, 2006), among others, and
it could be worthwhile to combine elements of such models with those of ours.
Additionally, the model￿ s suggestion that derailed, repressive dictators are rather un-
happy and su⁄er from ex-post regret (recall the discussion around footnotes 24 and 25)
implies that they could in principle be persuaded to step down voluntarily, since it should
be possible to o⁄er them an outside option that is better than their (poor) status quo
as an unhappy dictator. History indeed suggests that this at least was the case: there
are many examples of repressive autocrats who chose to step down after being o⁄ered an
asylum or amnesty escape option - enabling their country to install a new leader. Some
notable examples include Idi Amin, Mengistu Haile Mariam, and Ferdinand Marcos, but
numerous other cases are discussed in Larcom, Sarr, and Willems (2014).
Recently, however, the international community has moved to an institutional frame-
work (centered around the International Criminal Court, henceforth "ICC", established
in 2002 and based in The Hague) in which such amnesty/asylum-abdication deals are
going to be made less easily. The background-presence of the ICC might make it more
di¢ cult to remove repressive dictators (despite the fact that they are unhappy) as the
potential prospect of having to stand trial makes them less keen to relinquish power. This
allegedly prevented Mugabe from abdicating after facing electoral defeat in 2008. While
Mugabe was reportedly ready to step down, his generals persuaded him otherwise as they
feared an ICC-prosecution. One of Mugabe￿ s lieutenants was quoted as saying that "[t]he
Old Man is staying, because I￿ m not ending up in The Hague."35 What followed was an
extremely violent period during which Zimbabweans had to su⁄er from hyperin￿ ation, a
cholera epidemic, as well as gross human rights violations.
On the positive side, the presence of the ICC holds the potential to discipline dictators
34Cf. footnote 14. Also see a recent related paper by Gilli and Li (2014), which develops a further
re￿nement by distinguishing between two groups that are able to launch a revolution: the ordinary
citizenry and the "selectorate" (an elite group that holds the e⁄ective power to choose the leader).
35See http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/when-justice-stands-in-the-way-of-a-dictators-
departure/article623912/. Also see Godwin (2010: 122) who quotes his personal chaplain as saying
in 2008 that "the Old Man is tired, he wants to go, but there are others around him who will not let him
step down".
26and to deter them ex ante. Consequently, it is a priori not clear whether the recent
move by the international community has indeed been counterproductive or not. Larcom,
Sarr, and Willems (2014) analyze this issue in a simple two-period setup and it could be
interesting to analyze a similar question using the framework developed in the present
paper (which models the dictator￿ s behavior in greater detail).
6 Conclusion
By the worst means, the worst. For mine own good,
All causes shall give way. I am in blood
Stepped in so far that, should I wade no more,
Returning were as tedious as go o￿ er.
William Shakespeare, Macbeth.
In this paper, we have developed a model that can explain the observed phenomenon
of dictators who, despite making a promising and seemingly well-intentioned start, end
up as dreaded tyrants - and vice versa. We have shown that such mutations can result
from, what at ￿rst sight appears to be, a rather minor non-congruence in preferences
between the dictator and (part of) the population - for example stemming from a lack
of accountability. The reason is that this initial imperfection can be greatly ampli￿ed
through the complementarity in the dictator￿ s stock of wrongdoings and his ￿ ow use of
repression: when the population considers a dictator to have committed wrongs in the
past, the dictator fears being overthrown as that may lead to corresponding punishment.
Consequently, such a dictator becomes more willing to commit further wrongs (in the
form of exercising repression) to reduce the probability of being ousted and punished (a
channel that Shakespeare already alluded to in "Macbeth", see the above epigraph). This
complementarity leads to the emergence of two steady states: one where repression is
low and one where repression is high. Under the realistic assumption that dictators have
imperfect information on their ability to "get away" with wrongdoings, our model can then
give rise to both sudden deteriorations in behavior, as well as to sudden improvements.
In line with many of the historical accounts discussed in the Introduction, either
development in our model is triggered by the mobilization of an opposition-movement
against the incumbent. If this movement starts while the dictator￿ s stock of wrongdoings
is still low enough, the dictator is disciplined (as for example happened to Ghana￿ s Jerry
Rawlings). But if the dictator￿ s stock of wrongdoings has crossed some critical level by
27the time the opposition mobilizes, a complete derailment of the dictator results and the
model ends up in a bad steady state where repression is high (cf. the case of Robert
Mugabe and Zimbabwe).
Interestingly, these results imply that anyone rising to power in our model environment
has the potential to end up as a repressive tyrant - even a non-sadistic individual who
has no desire for repression per se (provided that his actions are not fully congruent
with the preferences of society, which seems to be a rather mild proviso - especially for
non-accountable regimes). It furthermore shows that the actions of a dictator early on
in his tenure do not have to correlate very strongly with his later behavior (even if his
preferences remain stable). Few people would have predicted the derailment of Robert
Mugabe when he was considered for the Nobel Peace Prize in the early 1980s, and yet
this is exactly what has happened.
Finally, our model implies that dictators are more likely to derail when they have
more divertible funds available. This identi￿es a risk associated with the popular policy
of rewarding well-behaving (but non-accountable) rulers with fungible aid in￿ ows (as
happened with Mugabe) and forms a new possible manifestation of the resource curse.
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